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Both in the media and in the world of academia, the observation and study of populism has 
become mainstream. With the exponential growth in the academic literature, including the publication 
of several hefty handbooks, populism studies have become a sub-discipline in the areas of 
comparative politics and comparative sociology. Yet a great deal of this literature looks at the 
demand side (amongst the population), while, perhaps, not giving sufficient attention to the supply 
side (the political leaders) who both emerge and create or, at least, encourage the populist demand. 
With its diversity of political cultures, regime types and types of leadership, Southeast Asia provides 
 
 
 
COMPETING INTEGRATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Southeast Asia’s Political Leaders: Populists, 
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Populism is characterized in the scientific literature as a thin 
ideology, a strategy, a political style or a combination of all 
three, pertinent to all political practice. Insights drawn from 
the observation of this global phenomenon are useful for EU 
policymakers to decipher political leadership in Southeast 
Asia. They provide a grid for evaluating Southeast Asian 
political leaders and exploring differences between their 
rhetoric and their practice. A further unpackaging of populism 
situates and draws out contradictions both in the rhetoric and 
practice of political leaders. Nevertheless, a concern with 
individual political leaders must be brought into focus with an 
understanding of political structures and regime types. These 
three analytical grids placed in an overlay, allow for an 
analysis that can help generate policy responses.  
Populism studies have become a sub-discipline in the areas 
of comparative politics and comparative sociology. Yet a 
great deal of this literature looks at the demand side, in 
particular populations while perhaps not giving sufficient 
attention to the supply side of those  political leaders who 
create and  encourage the populist demand. With its diversity 
of political cultures, regime types and types of leadership, 
Southeast Asia provides a rich terrain for such study and a 
challenge to policy makers. 
 
 David Camroux, March 2019 
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a rich terrain for such study. This is precisely the objective of studies conducted by researchers in 
Work Package 3 and Work Package 4 of the CRISEA project. 
 
 
Understanding Political Leaders 
Jan-Werner Müller has argued that “… populism is not a matter of a specific psychological 
cast, a particular class, or simplistic policies…populism is not just any mobilization strategy that 
appeals to “the people”… populists do not just criticize elites; they also claim that they, and only they, 
represent the true people.” (Müller 2016, 40)  
In the literature the distinction is made between populism as  a ‘thin’ ideology i.e. one that 
can co-exist with multiple other ideologies, as merely a strategy to obtain popular support or,  as a 
performative style, a form of behaviour in front of the media and the people designed to show that 
he/she is “one of us”. In Southeast Asia today, it is revealing to contrast a conservative monarchist, 
General Prayut Chan-o-cha, as he attempted to frame his policies with populist appeal in order to 
become legitimized as an elected, rather than military-imposed, Prime Minister with President 
Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines,  a self-proclaimed socialist, able to frame his pro-capitalist 
economic policies in a populist garb. Mahathir Mohamad, on the other hand,  resurrected as a 
committed democrat, continues the  ethno-nationalist appeal that he successfully used in his twenty-
year period of Prime Minister under a regime with regular elections that were neither totally free nor 
fair. The third kind is illustrated by  
Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ and  Cambodia’s ostensibly unmoveable leader Hun Sen. Myanmar 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s populism may be more difficult to categorize. When in opposition as a 
democratic icon, her mystique and popularity had two sources: the unction from the international 
community and, something, very locally Burmese, the incarnation of a minlaung ('imminent king'), 
“one who overthrows an unjust ruler and restores benevolent rule in accordance with Buddhist 
principles" (Harriden 2012). As the de facto civilian president under the surveillance of the military in 
a hybrid regime she has, at least partly, embraced a more xenophobic language and style much 
different from her more inclusive populist appeal when in opposition.  
Four main axes of populist behaviour have been identified based on Gagnon (2018: vi-xxvi 
), which, irrespective of whether one wants to apply the term populist or not, have the advantage of 
providing a template for examining and comparing political leaders. They are: (1) Exclusionary – 
inclusionary; (2) Xenophobic – cosmopolitan; (3) Authoritarian – democratic; and (4) Market 
fundamentalist – redistributive.  
- Exclusion or inclusion is central to the appeal of political leaders whether they be populists 
or not. Populist politicians are in principle anti-elite: a corrupt elite being juxtaposed against the real, 
or worthy people. Rodrigo Duterte might inveigh against “Manila imperialism,” but in practice he has 
accommodated himself to the business elites in the Philippines’ capital. His exclusion operates at 
the other end of the social spectrum: the unworthy people in the slums who are drug users and 
dealers, or his former Communist allies. In multi-cultural societies such as Malaysia and Myanmar, 
the issue of exclusion or inclusion is even more relevant. In Myanmar, seventy years after 
independence, developing an inclusive language and practice to embrace non-Bamar Buddhists is 
a work in progress. In Malaysia, a programme of ethnic inclusiveness was central to the victory of 
the Pakatan Harapan coalition in the May 2018 federal elections, the country’s first political 
alternance since independence. Yet once elected, the new government has found that reforming the 
positive discrimination policies in favour of the bumiputra (essentially Malay) population has 
engendered a wholesale pushback. In the Thai elections of March 2019, General Prayut emulated 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s inclusive populist appeals to voters in the north and 
north-east of Thailand to have his usurped Prime Ministerial position legitimized by a popular vote. 
By their nature one-party regimes, such as that in Vietnam, generate a more inclusive political 
rhetoric albeit one expressed in unconvincing patriotic Marxist terms. 
- Situating populist leaders along the axis of authoritarianism and democracy, the political 
rhetoric and practice of newly re-elected Indonesian President Joko Widodo is interesting. It 
contradicts the assumption that Southeast Asian leaders would generally be authoritarian. For 
Widodo, only a democratic process can provide political legitimacy. Similarly, Rodrigo Duterte’s 
performance has all the traits of an authoritarian strongman, yet, there is no indication he will try to 
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prolong his term in office beyond 2022. Besides, the opportunists who have switched allegiance to 
him in the Philippines Congress have shown that they will not allow him to do so. Hun Sen in 
Cambodia and Prayut Chan-o-cha in Thailand, on the other hand, undermining the democratic 
system is paving the road towards a form of electoral autocratic rule. In Myanmar, Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the National League for Democracy know that only the democratic process provides them 
the legitimacy to compete with the military, who portray themselves as the custodians of national 
unity. 
- The populist-type language used by many politicians in Southeast Asia is in essence 
redistributive. Nonetheless, they may still not support redistributive economic policies in practice. 
This is the case of Thai PM Prayut who has shown no inclination to reform an economic system that 
has engendered the most inegalitarian society in the region, and of President Duterte, a self-declared 
socialist, whose faith in market mechanisms backs his efforts to attract private and overseas 
infrastructure investments. In Indonesia redistributive measures such as more widespread health 
care and improved educational facilities rely on improving the functioning of the existing capitalist 
system, not on overthrowing it. In Vietnam, Communist leaders making the economy more market-
friendly for investors, do so while still accommodating their own vested interests in State Owned 
Enterprises. 
Regime types 
Southeast Asia’s diversity is manifest in its gamut of political regime types ranging from 
Brunei’s authoritarian monarchy to Indonesia’s vibrant and decentralized democracy. In which 
regime type does populism flourish the most? It seems that for a populist leader there is greater 
political space to function in a presidential system (such as the republican Philippines or Indonesia) 
than in a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. In a semi-constitutional monarchy such as Thailand, 
where the king is a key political actor with a large number of prerogatives (the scope of which has 
increased in the last two years) there is little room for a paternalist leader who attempts to implement 
populist policies to remain in power. As recent history has shown, former Thai PMs Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck were overthrown by military coups that were probably approved 
by the Palace, in 2006 and in 2014, respectively when they attempted to transform populist rhetoric 
into the instituting of populist policies.  
On the contrary, Malaysia’s weak constitutional monarchy with a rotation in the Agong every 
five years, did not hinder Mohammad Mahathir from dominating Malaysian politics for two decades 
and now anew. The latest presidential campaign in Indonesia was a fascinating example of a 
competition between the incumbent, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who has been described as a 
‘technocratic populist’, against Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of the Indonesian dictator Suharto, 
who has been described as an ‘authoritarian populist’. The checks and balances, coalition-building 
constraints within the parliament, and the decentralized structures of Indonesian politics developed 
since Reformasi in 1998, make a return to strong-man rule unlikely.  
One-party states, such as Vietnam and Laos, and virtual one-party states such as Cambodia, 
offer a different context. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s collegial style of leadership, with a 
degree of internal factional democracy at its top echelons, has prevented the emergence of a populist 
strongman. Nguyen Tan Dung, Prime Minister from 2006-2016, found himself expelled from office 
after he attempted to take on a second position in the county’s triumvirate of leadership. Yet in 
Cambodia, Hun Sen by progressively undermining the countries’ multi-party system while facing few 
challenges within his own Cambodian People’s Party, has strengthened his power since becoming 
Prime Minister in 1985. He seems also be to be grooming his son, to replace him and resembles 
Rodrigo Duterte who has invested considerably in his daughter Sara’s political career. However, 
given that political dynasties (both thin and thick) control some two thirds of political positions in the 
Philippines, her elevation is a worrying reinforcement of the oligarchic nature of the Philippines 
political regime. 
 
In Myanmar’s hybrid regime, the military play a caretaker role through their control of 25% of 
seats in parliament and three key ministries: Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs (Egreteau 
2016). They expulsed 700,000 Rohingya in 2017 and in complicity with Islamophobic elements in 
the Sangha, set the political discourse that accompanies such action. Thus, the de facto civilian 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi seems constrained to articulate an ethno-nationalist defence of their action 
in order to appeal to her Bamar-Buddhist electoral support base which militates in the same direction. 
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• The soft-balancing / soft-hedging which is common in foreign relations of most Southeast 
Asian countries, irrespective of regime type and leadership practice, opens space for the EU 
and its member states to occupy a countervailing place within the region. In the present 
regional context of increased Sino-American rivalry, the role of third parties, such as Japan 
and the EU, will increase in importance to address illiberal and populist challenges in 
Southeast Asia while balancing its interests and the respect for universal values. By 
empowering democratic institutions and democratizing actors in Southeast Asia, the EU 
strengthens human rights’ advocacy. 
 
• In countries where the media are still relatively free, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, 
the EU should give strong support for media freedom. In others, such as Cambodia, where 
organized opposition parties have been decimated, discrete support of the opposition via civil 
society groups may be the only option. In authoritarian regimes, such as Vietnam, utilizing 
the space of liberty in academia and cultural exchange is the default option. Present debates 
concerning action towards illiberal regimes such as in Myanmar and in Cambodia, raise the 
issue of the problematic nature of economic sanctions. Yet a targeted use of sanctions can 
promote respect for human rights and democratic norms.  
 
• The EU should seek to understand the ‘populist publics’ that underpin the different regime 
types. It needs to understand how political resistance takes shape in the media, the academy 
and in grassroots movements, such as those of indigenous peoples.  
As demonstrated by the impact of sustainable forestry requirements imposed by the EU in 
Indonesia and sustainable fishery norms in Thailand, the weight of access to the European 
market counts. Being the world’s largest provider of Overseas Development Assistance and 
a major supplier of foreign investment, the EU market power can also be harnessed in 
promoting the EU’s ethical agenda. This is also the case of the recently signed EU-Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement which strengthens labour rights. 
 
Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA) is an interdisciplinary research 
project that studies multiple forces affecting regional integration in Southeast Asia and the 
challenges they present to the peoples of Southeast Asia and its regional institutional framework, 
ASEAN.  
 
CRISEA innovates by encouraging ‘macro-micro’ dialogue between disciplines: global level 
analyses in international relations and political economy alongside socio-cultural insights from the 
grassroots methodologies of social sciences and the humanities. 
 
Coordinated by the Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO) with its unique network of ten field 
centres in Southeast Asia, the project brings together researchers from seven European and six 
Southeast Asian institutions, with three objectives: 
 
1. Research on regional integration 
Multiple internal and external forces drive regional integration in Southeast Asia and compete for 
resources and legitimacy. CRISEA has identified five ‘arenas of competition’ for the interplay of 
these forces, investigated in the project’s five research Work Packages. It further aims to assess 
the extent to which they call into question the centrality of ASEAN’s regional model. 
 
2. Policy relevance 
CRISEA reaches beyond academia to engage in public debate and impact on practitioners in 
government and non-government spheres. By establishing mechanisms for dialogue with targeted 
audiences of policymakers, stakeholders and the public, the project furthers European science 
diplomacy in Southeast Asia and promotes evidence-based policymaking. 
 
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 RESEARCH PARAMETERS 
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3. Networking and capacity-building 
CRISEA reinforces the European Research Area (ERA) in the field of Asian Studies through 
coordinated EU-ASEAN academic exchange and network development. It connects major 
research hubs with emerging expertise across Europe and Southeast Asia. CRISEA also promotes 
participation of younger generation academics in all its activities, notably policy dialogues. 
 
 
 
PROJECT NAME Competing Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA) 
 
  
COORDINATOR  Andrew Hardy, EFEO, Paris, France, hardyvn25@yahoo.com. 
 
  
CONSORTIUM Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient – EFEO – Paris, France 
University of Hamburg – UHAM – Hamburg, Germany 
University of Naples l’Orientale – UNO – Naples, Italy  
Institute of Social  and Political Sciences – ISCSP - Lisbon, Portugal 
University of Lodz - UL – Lodz, Poland 
University of Oslo – UiO – Oslo, Norway 
University of Cambridge – Cam – Cambridge, UK 
Chiang Mai University – CMU – Chiang Mai, Thailand  
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies - CSIS – Jakarta, Indonesia 
Ateneo de Manila University – ADMU – Quezon City, Philippines 
University of Malaya – UM – Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences – VASS – Hanoi, Vietnam 
The University of Mandalay – MU – Mandalay, Myanmar 
  
FUNDING SCHEME  H2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation of the European 
Union – Research Innovation Action (RIA) – Europe in a changing world, 
Engaging together globally 
 
  
DURATION   November 2017 – October 2020 (36 months). 
 
  
BUDGET EU contribution: €2,500,000.00 
 
  
WEBSITE www.crisea.eu 
 
  
FOR MORE 
INFORMATION  
Contact:  
Jacques LEIDER, CRISEA scientific coordinator – jacques.leider@efeo.net 
Elisabeth LACROIX, CRISEA project manager – ideas.lacroix@gmail.com 
 
  
FURTHER READING Müller, Jan Werner. What is Populism? Philadelphia PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 
Harriden, Jessica.  The Authority of Influence: Women and Power in Burmese 
History. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2012.  
Gagnon, Jean-Paul et al. “What is Populism? Who is the Populist?”, Democratic 
Theory 5 (2) 2018: vi-xxvi.  
Egreteau, Renaud. Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political 
Change in Myanmar, London: Hurst, 2016. 
 
  
 PROJECT IDENTITY 
